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1. The main directions taken
Starting in early 1994, and even more since May of this year, I have had the 
recurrent dream of Peter Schlemihl, that of having lost my shadow, the prob­
lem of administrative reform, which has been following me for over a quarter 
of a century now. I have not managed to lose it and here I am now to write of 
this subject again.
I would like to begin by reviewing the main directions taken by the Ciampi 
government in the field of administration.
In the Ciampi government’s program, administrative reform occupied an 
unusual place as compared to the past. It was a question not only of reorganiz­
ing administration in the fields of agriculture and forestry, tourism and enter­
tainment, state shareholdings, banks and local health departments, due to the 
results of the referendum of April 1993, but also of preparing “the actions to 
be taken by future administrations for their indispensable modernization” and 
reducing corruption in the administration. In the governmental program, the 
remedies to these problems were seen as simpler and more correct adminis­
trative procedures, more binding and logical ethical rules, and efficient 
controls.
The concrete action of the government, promptly proclaimed in all its am­
plitude and implemented at a fast pace, took five different directions.
The first of these was aimed at restoring sovereignty to the users and ren­
dering public administration more reliable, prompt and comprehensible.
To put the administration at the service of the citizens, a “Public Service 
Chart”, similar in some respects to the “Citizen's Charter”, was adopted, later 
to be included in a government directive, stating standards of quality and 
quantity. This served as example to large organizations, educational institutes, 
local health departments and other public services, which have, in turn, estab­
lished standards for their own activity. In the same direction, a series of 
experimental projects was promoted (in particular, the so-called “Hundred 
projects at the service of the citizens”), especially on the local level, aimed at 
renovating procedures, accelerating and simplifying government activity, 
making the administration “user-friendly”, and bringing it closer to the 




























































































To speed up administrative activity, the law of 1990 on administrative pro­
cedures was relaunched (almost all of the Ministers approved the regulations 
on schedules and on responsibility; cases of silent assent tripled in number; the 
associations of local authorities committed themselves to implementing the 
law) and recourse to self-certification was facilitated and extended. Even more 
important, 70 regulations were deliberated which have simplified approxi­
mately 100 procedures, including those for the management of public expendi­
ture, for purchasing supplies and services, for expropriation, for locating 
public works and for granting driver’s licenses. This has resulted in an overall 
reduction of 14 years in administrative time (calculated only on the approved 
measures; this time savings could be doubled by implementing the rest of the 
law).
To make public administration more comprehensible, a “style code” con­
taining instructions for communicating with the public was drawn up.
The second direction taken by the reform was designed to slenderize and 
simplify administrative structures. For this purpose, one ministry (that of the 
Merchant Marine), 13 inter-ministerial committees and over 70 collegiate 
bodies were abolished. In addition, numerous ministries were modernized, 
with the approval of the government regulations on internal re-organization 
(Ministries of Health, of the Budget and Planning, of Foreign Trade).
Reducing the number of state structures served to improve the organization 
of public services as well as to lower their costs, with services upgraded, not 
by assigning them to external organizations, as was done previously with the 
establishment of boards and authorities. In reorganizing health services and 
regulating the hiring of personnel, greater independence was conferred on lo­
cal boards (authorities, government units). Parallel to their growing financial 
autonomy, these local boards were granted the freedom to hire personnel (and 
further developments would have ensued had the National Association of Ital­
ian Municipalities A.N.C.I. made proposals, rather than demands).
The goal of the third approach was that of making public administrations 
less expensive, by reducing both the fiscal charges they produce and the bu­
reaucratic cost involved (thus affecting not only the costs registered in the 
State budget, but also those entered in family budgets). To attain this goal, the 
Ciampi government linked administrative reform and financial reconstruction.
In the Budget for 1994, approved in December 1993, regulations were in­




























































































nization consisted of merging ministries, reorganizing and privatizing public 
bodies, utilizing State employees more efficiently, determining work loads, 
selling public property, revising prices and fees for public goods and services, 
re-negotiating contract prices for the execution of works and the supply of 
goods and services.
This reorganization also involved schools and universities. For the school 
system, it reduced the number of classes and conferred autonomy on educa­
tional institutions. For the universities, it consisted of instituting financial 
autonomy, the most important university reform in the last forty years, as re­
cently stated by the chairman of the board of the presidents of Italian univer­
sities.
The reductions in costs and the savings on expenditure resulting from these 
initiatives have been calculated at approximately 2600 billion lire (the initial 
assessment of the Department of Public Administration ranged between 5 and 
6 thousand billion, but the more cautious estimate of the Minister of the Trea­
sury was later accepted). In addition to the improved efficiency resulting from 
this program, the lower costs sustained over the mid-term should not be un­
derestimated. In fact, more careful management of organizational, personnel 
and financial resources in an area such as that of public service, where waste 
has been the rule for years, can produce significant savings in a span of 3 to 5 
years.
The fourth direction taken by the reform was designed to make administra­
tive activity more neutral and more correct. To make it more neutral, the 
“legislative decree” (decreto legislative)) n° 29 of 1993 was implemented 
(while the scope of contractual negotiation was clearly specified by introduc­
ing the principle that, as regards labour issues, the contract prevails over the 
law) as regards the appointment of directors, the participation of extraneous 
persons in commissions for competitive examinations, external appointments 
of magistrates and, in general, separation between politics and administration.
To make administrative activity more correct, efforts were made to reduce 
not only corruption but also its ensuing costs. To fight against corruption, a 
“code of behaviour for State employees”, an ethical code, was issued, too. 
Furthermore, the system of controls was changed, obliging each administra­
tion to establish offices of internal control, introducing controls on costs and 
benefits, also on a comparative basis (along with the obsolete legitimacy 





























































































To curtail costs deriving from corruption, public administrations were re­
quired to re-negotiate contract prices. This was proposed not only in consid­
eration of the high cost of corruption (assessed as around 10 thousand billion 
lire per year) but also in view of the striking disparity - observed by the In­
spectorate of the Department of Public Administration - between the prices 
paid for the same goods and services by different administrative departments.
The fifth direction was that of bringing Italian public powers closer to Eu­
rope. A great step forward in this direction was taken with the approval, in 
February 1994, of the regulation allowing citizens of other European nations 
to accede to Italian public office. Other interventions regarded the manage­
ment of EC Funds.
These directions of reform were not entirely unfamiliar to administrative 
policy and culture. On the contrary, many of them had been even been embod­
ied in previous laws (such as those of 1968 and 1970 on general administrative 
reform or those of 1970 and 1977 on public bodies), which had however 
never been put into effect. The concrete implementation of these laws ap­
peared important. A good reform project must, in fact, draw inspiration from 
the fall-out from previous bills, breathe new life into them and, lastly, enforce 
them (linking them to new objectives). In so doing, the Ciampi government - 
an apolitical government of technocrats - took up again and implemented many 
projects promoted by politicians in previous years, thus finding political legit­
imation in the tradition of reform ideals.
Called upon to collaborate in the overall design for reform were experts in 
administrative problems (jurists, administrators, experts in the science of ad­
ministration, economists, historians, statisticians, etc.) in commissions, com­
mittees and working teams. No less than 500 persons were variously involved 
in the preparation of the 35 volumes published in 1993-94 by the Department 
of Public Administration. These volumes contain statistical analyses, sectorial 
studies, research on personnel, legislative proposals, etc. An essential contri­
bution was made individually by a number of magistrates of the State Council 
and the Court of Auditors as well as by the consultation sections of the State 
Council, who expressed opinions on the numerous regulations designed to 
simplify procedures.
Among these external contributions, that of a group of young researchers 
from the University of Rome was of major importance. They dedicated them­
selves entirely, with great commitment and enthusiasm, to carrying out studies 




























































































tion has been fundamental. The very fact that there exists so much capacity and 
so much enthusiasm gives us great hopes for the future.
The result of this appeal to so many forces both outside of and within the 
State administration has been, if not the establishment of a new administrative 
culture, at least the integration of various disciplines, applied to the problems 
of public structures. A conspicuous amount of study and investigation, includ­
ing the establishment of a data bank on administrative procedures, (including 
all the procedures of State administrations), was involved.
The depth and scope of the modernization program, which ranged from re­
organization of ministries to procedures, from personnel to finance, from 
public functions to public services, can be better evaluated by comparing it 
with previous major reform efforts; for example, that of Lucifredi (1950), 
designed to decentralize government activity but achieving only the so-called 
bureaucratic decentralization; or that of 1968-70 (laws n° 249 of March 18, 
1968 and n° 775 of October 28, 1970), aimed at reorganizing central and pe­
ripheral bureaus, simplifying procedures, reorganizing careers according to 
qualification, reducing them in number and modifying the salary scale of per­
sonnel. This program was however set up to operate in a mechanical manner 
and actually achieved only regionalization - 1970, 1972, 1977 - and reform of 
the Ministry of the Budget and Planning and that of State Economic Participa­
tion, reform of secondary schools and public administration, as well as of high 
civil service, a reform which was to remain half-finished). Lastly, comparison 
should be made with the “Report on the major problems of State administra­
tion”, presented before Parliament on November 16, 1979 and followed by the 
Senate agenda of July 10, 1980, designed to restore efficiency to the adminis­
tration and provide space for administrative techniques.
2. Politics as “the lesser of evils”
Jeremy Bentham, in his Introduction to the principles of moral legislation 
published in 1789, observed that “politics is like medicine: its only task is that 
of choosing between evils”. Those who are convinced of the truth of this 
statement cannot analyze the work of a government taking into consideration 
only what it has done, without considering the difficulties encountered, what it 
has tried not to do, what it has prevented others from doing and, lastly, what it 




























































































If the first aspect is not considered and if the adverse winds - to avoid a 
more highly abused metaphor - are not mentioned, the risk is that of present­
ing reformatory action as work carried out in a mechanical manner, at the full 
discretion of the government, which is free to do as it likes. If the second as­
pect is not considered, no account is taken of the negative decisions and it thus 
becomes impossible to appreciate, at the crossroads of decision, the validity of 
the various options. If the third aspect is not taken into consideration, it will be 
forgotten that political action includes, as Bentham taught, not only the 
“agenda” but also the “non agenda”. It also consists, in fact, of preventing oth­
ers from acting. Lastly, if the chances missed are not considered, the limita­
tions of the action taken cannot be evaluated.
I will insist on all of these aspects, since they represent the non-visible side 
of government action. While some of them may fall under the heading of 
“assets” (in particular, the list of negative actions and impediments), others 
constitute “liabilities” (including failures and partial successes), and still others 
can serve to explain the decisions taken, the negative actions or the failures.
3. The Minister of Public Administration, 
staff office of the Prime Minister
Before going on, I would like to consider a question that has sometimes 
been asked: was too much attempted? I will “consider” this only, leaving to 
others the task of evaluation..
The first aspect: a non-parliamentary minister has the advantage of greater 
freedom, not being engaged in Parliament except for matters pertinent to his 
job. To this may be added the advantages of a minister who has never sought 
to have a political career and thus has no interest in being elected or re­
elected. The members of previous governments instead had to devote much 
time to their constituency and their parties; those of the current government, 
to public opinion and the media. In comparison, a full-time minister has much 
more energy to dedicate to his public functions.
Second: the Minister of Public Administration is entitled on two accounts to 
act as staff minister of the Prime Minister. On the one hand, he is a minister - 
at least formally - without portfolio. On the other, he must take an interest in 




























































































new role for this minister were established in 1993, with the change in organi­
zation of the Department of Public Administration. In the past it had been re­
garded as a “ministry of State employees”. With the reform adopted in 1993, it 
has been called upon to deal with not only with personnel, but also with ad­
ministrative organization, procedures and innovations.
This particular position of the Minister of Public Administration requires 
him to carry out a series of tasks which may be considered marginal, such as - 
to give examples concerning myself - participation in decisions relevant to 
Rome as capital, to privatizations, to the formulation of a project for new leg­
islation on radio and television, to licenses for telephone systems (GSM).
The principal tasks of the Minister of Public Administration, however, 
apart from his traditional sector of public administration, were two, the first 
relevant to preparation of the Budget, the second to stipulating government 
laws and regulations. I would like to say more of these two roles, since they 
are no longer linked to a person, but to the institution.
The fact that the Minister of Public Administration formed part of the 
group of ministers responsible for drawing up the Budget and the Supplemen­
tary Budget and following their passage through Parliament made it possible, 
in 1993, to formulate the Budget law and the Supplementary budget on new 
bases. In the past, they were preceded by the “circular” note sent out by the 
Ministry of the Treasury which, while calling for savings, specified no prin­
ciples on which economy was to be based and set no quantitative objectives. In 
1993, for the first time, a different procedure was experimented through 
which, also thanks to the assistance of the technical Committee on Public Ex­
penditure, the costs attributed to each ministry could be listed (the budget is 
arranged by “tables” according to the ministries, but some tables also include 
costs from different ministries) and quantitative savings goals for major cost 
categories could be established. The other important aspect of this task con­
sisted of stipulating amendments to the associated provision to the Budget, 
carried out mainly by the Minister of Public Administration with the Rappor­
teur, first in the Senate, then in the House.
The second task was that of drafting regulations. To give an idea of the im­
portance of this activity, a few words should be said about the Council of 
Ministers and the “law-making force of bureaucracy”. The former is a poorly 
equipped collegiate body where, in general, brief duration in office and scanty 
knowledge of the administrative sector make ministers the slaves of their own 




























































































pointed, even when his term of office is brief, becomes the defender to the 
death of his own ministry and its actions. As a result, each sectorial minister 
has a dual relationship with his own structure. He depends on it for informa­
tion and proposals; and he is the “attorney” for the sector he administers (the 
Minister of Agriculture for farmers, the Minister of Finance for tax-payers, 
the Minister of Labour for employees, etc.). What is lacking is someone to as­
sume responsibility for the consistency of decisions, their inter-sectorial ef­
fects, and the general interest.
The ministers, in turn, depend on bureaucracy, which is a great producer of 
laws. De-legislation, in fact, encounters the resistance of bureaucracy, which 
wants to see its work written in laws. The same can be said for simplification 
of procedures, which takes work away from offices. Moreover, bureaucracy 
frequently recurs to laws because it does not wish to assume responsibility it­
self, through administrative acts, or because it encounters resistance from 
other administrations. Law thus becomes an instrument for shifting responsi­
bility onto the shoulders of others, or for getting around inter-administrational 
difficulties. Lastly, bureaucracy lives on laws, since it has to interpret them by 
issuing circulars, which in some sectors (the Finance Ministry, for instance) 
has become a recognized job.
The functioning of the Council of Ministers and the attitude of bureaucracy 
explain the need for someone who concerns himself with the drawing up of 
regulations and the decisions which this involves. The Minister of Public Ad­
ministration must therefore be attentive to the drafting of texts 
(“bureaucratese” is a real monster): I once happened to hear that a municipal 
council had to be disbanded because it had been infiltrated by racketeers, with 
the motivation “for irresponsibility enacted” stated by the vice mayor). In 
addition, he must be ready to act on the proposals of other ministers, to ensure 
horizontal coordination and consistent action of the government, apart from 
looking after sectorial interests. It is understandable that this role has put the 
Minister of Public Administration in the foreground, as it has put administra­
tive reform on the political agenda. It is less comprehensible that this task 
should fall to one who is by profession a non-politician. This is eloquent testi­
mony to the inadequacy of party-oriented politics.
In conclusion, having organized the work of the Department of Public 
Administration as a task of the Prime Minister’s staff has made it possible to 
reverse the old setup, which brought politics into the administration, bringing, 




























































































I should add that none of this would have been possible without the initiative 
and the unflagging support of the Prime Minister. Mr. President Ciampi was 
convinced of the need to reform public administration. Like all of the best 
men who directly experienced the constituent era he had learned that the most 
daring idealism clashes against bureaucratic inertia or resistance. Convinced of 
this, Mr. President Ciampi guided reform with a style of his own, probably 
formulated during his years of directing the Banca d’ltalia: inciting, encourag­
ing, isolating major problems and thoroughly examining all aspects of them. If 
I were asked to specify the main traits of a statesman and a governor, these 
would be at the top of my list.
4. Difficulties encountered (The major problems)
We now come to the difficulties and resistance encountered. Both one and 
the other came primarily from those directly affected who, struck by the pro­
visions adopted or by the “negative action”, opposed resistance, as is only nat­
ural. It is not so much this resistance that I wish to recall, however, as the ef­
fect it had on public perception of the problems, through a sort of piloted re­
fraction of information.
It must be acknowledged that, in general, the media gave this work full cov­
erage. This was due also to circulation of information, based on efficient for­
mulas (in November 1993, the fact that bureaucracy could be considered a 
hidden tax amounting to 15 thousand billion lire; in the following December, 
the criticism of “bureaucratese” and the relevant proposals, stated in the “style 
code”). It should be added that, especially from some sides, only consensus was 
heard. This was true in particular of Civiltà Cattolica and Avvenire, during 
both the initial phase, May-June 1993 and the final phase, in January 1994, and 
II Sole-24 Ore for the entire period.
It is just for this reason that the effects produced by the resistance of those 
directly affected appear even more singular. A few examples will suffice to 
shed light on how news can be manipulated.
In the latter half of January 1994, instructions to the ministries requesting 
respect for working hours, in application of laws existing for decades, became 
a “cappuccino circular”, evoking an unfair restriction of the right to take a 
coffee break, with consequent complains from both employees and coffee bars 





























































































In February-March 1994, the National Association of Builders brought ac­
tion against the obligation to re-negotiate public contracts, under the banner of 
the slogan “re-negotiation is paralyzing public administration” (an untrue 
statement, since what was blocking bureaucracy was its fear of assuming re­
sponsibility, after the frequent intervention of the law courts, especially crimi­
nal courts).
The national union of driving schools and automobile consultation studios 
promoted, in February 1994, a press campaign opposed to simplifying the 
procedure for granting drivers’ licenses. On February 5, II Giornale entitled 
an article “Government opens the road to licensed offenders”; Italia Oggi on 
February 25, 1994 carried the headline “Habitual criminals at the wheel”. 
None of these headlines was in any way related to the proposed and later ap­
proved provision, considering that the Ministry of Transportation’s informa­
tion system had already been connected for years to that of the Ministry of the 
Interior.
In the same month of February 1994, Confcommercio (the Union of trade 
enterprises), opposed to the introduction of the silent-assent principle for 
commercial licenses, by promoting a press campaign which induced II Tempo 
to headline an article appearing on February 5, 1994, “Cassese favours far- 
west in trade”. An article with the same title appearing in II Giornale of 
February 9, 1994, added in the sub-title “And the bakers are ready to turn off 
their ovens”, thus indirectly threatening that Italians would have their daily 
bread taken away from them.
The calculation, made at the start of 1994, that in the entire public sector, 
on the basis of 22,000 competitive examinations already authorized, 400 thou­
sand competitions be started or were already in progress, was transformed 
during the electoral campaign into the announcement of 400 thousand new 
posts (while it was really a question of posts already occupied). This an­
nouncement, in turn, was taken as an electoral ploy in view of a candidature in 
the political elections.
Lastly, the attempt in April of 1994 to put into effect the results of the ref­
erendum on abrogation by abolishing the Ministry of Agricultural, Food and 
Forestry Resources, established in place of the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Forestry, was presented as an attempt to undermine the safeguarding of Italian 
interests in Brussels (while the absence of a ministry did not exclude the pos­
sibility of having a minister responsible for agricultural, food and forestry af­




























































































In all of these events, it is hard to see how much consists of defending those 
directly affected the reform and how much, instead, of the tendency to create a 
fictitious public life where storms are stirred up over problems that may not 
even exist (and then accepting a solemn response, just as loud and meaningless 
as the storm). It is true then, as Umberto Eco has remarked, that any subject, 
once it has been taken up by the media, becomes part of a real world, since it 
is assumed that newspapers tell the truth. From that moment on it is widely 
discussed and critically analyzed, even if it is really non-existent.
A second kind of obstacles came from political parties, concerned that the 
activity of the department of Public Administration might affect the interests 
of the other ministries. The objections that had emerged in November 1993 
were posed again, in the pre-electoral stage, on March 2, 1994, by the secre­
tary of a party which, to block implementation of the mandate for ministerial 
reform, observed that “Sabino Cassese is very capable, but very Jacobin”, be­
cause he wanted to carry out ministerial reform with the Houses of Parliament 
closed. But Parliament had already given the government a mandate. If there 
was ever a moment at which this mandate should have been and had to be ex­
ercised, it was in the transition from one government to another, considering 
the obvious difficulties of making changes in the organization of the ministries 
of a government in office.
In the third place the difficulties caused by the trade unions were much 
greater, originating from numerous factors. The first of these was the intense 
legislative activity carried out in regard to public employment, directed at 
amending “legislative decree” (decreto legislative)) n° 29 of 1993, which was 
the fruit of an agreement with the unions (giving rise to the need for consulta­
tion on two corrective decrees, n° 470 and n° 456 of 1993). This legislative 
activity made it possible to affirm the principle that the contract prevails over 
the law. That the unions failed to understand this (or preferred the dual dis­
cipline, consisting of both law and contract) must be considered shortsighted­
ness (or hypocrisy).
The second factor involving friction was the attitude of the top management 
of the agency for the contractual representatives of public administrations. 
Entrusting the management of this agency to a single person - who was 
favoured by the trade unions - was not the best guarantee of neutrality for this 
organization nor of separation between governmental direction and union bar­




























































































The third reason had to do with co-management. It is true that the unions 
had approved “legislative decree” (decreto legislative) n° 29 of 1993, which 
obliged them to leave the collegiate bodies, but putting this commitment into 
practice turned out to be difficult. In December 1993 the Department of Pub­
lic Administration had to step in again at least as concerned the competitive 
examination commissions, to which attention had been drawn by a decision of 
the Constitutional Court.
Further opposition was aroused by the positions assumed in regard to tem­
porary personnel (against their being put on the permanent staff), to surplus 
personnel (determining the number of surplus persons and either dismissing 
them or temporarily suspending them from work, not a part of routine prac­
tice and subjected to new regulations in 1993), in regard to working hours (to 
be determined on the basis of the needs of the users rather than those of the 
State employees), to absenteeism in public offices (to prevent the abuse of fic­
titious illnesses, through which State employees can double their vacation 
time), as regards trade union leaves of absence and permits (whose cost has 
been assessed at 500 billion lire a year), as regards unemployment benefits (the 
so-called “cassa integrazione”) for state employees (consisting, in reality, of 
more careful application of the practice of temporary suspension from work).
Lastly, the resistance of the trade unions was aroused by the emphasis 
placed on the citizens. The unions realized that they could no longer consider 
the Ministry of Public Administration as the representative of State employees 
in the government and thus their spokesman. They realized that the Minister 
was listening, instead, to the interests of the users, assigning them priority 
over the interests of those providing the services.
In reality, the unions had no experience of ministers who operated over 
such a vast field without yielding or retreating and who refused to act as de­
fender of public employment. A perfect example of this can be seen in the 
question of contracts (normally, the Minister of Public Administration acts as 
attorney for expenditure, requesting the funds for contracts). In the years 
when the political parties were embroiled in crisis the unions had become 
more aggressive, filling a political void, as if they constituted a third Cham­
ber. On the one hand, they were conspicuously financed by the State (10 thou­
sand State employees transferred produce, as has been determined, a cost of 
approximately 500 billion lire, six times higher than that of the political par­
ties, abrogated by referendum in 1993). On the other hand the directors of 
some sectors, such as the postal and the welfare departments, were asking to 




























































































but actually maintaining the status quo (for example, in spite of public state­
ments to the contrary, the two thousand Agensud -a state agency operating in 
Southern Italy- employees). All this was done allegedly on the basis of proce­
dural democracy, but actually with a request for mixed commissions marked 
by rivalry, loquacity and verbal aggressiveness.
It is remarkable that this incessant conflict was interwoven with steady dia­
logue with the Minister, the like of which, I believe, had never before been 
sought and obtained by the unions.
In the fourth place, difficulties arose from functional conflicts with particu­
lar bureaucracies, in particular that of the Ministry of Labour, which tends to 
consider itself the “guardian” of employment, to the detriment of public 
administration, as regards placing personnel in State jobs. This led to 
numerous conflicts, starting in May of 1933, with regard to hiring State 
employees on a short-term basis, to assigning unemployment benefits to 
political party employees, to the hiring by public administrations of private 
couriers (who had known since the 1950s that they would lose their jobs), to 
reductions in pensions.
In the fifth place, difficulties came from the Ministry of the Treasury, ac­
customed to considering itself the true “guardian” of public office, in conflict 
with the Department of Public Administration, especially when the latter took 
an interest in the problems of public finance.
Giolitti maintained that a good minister of the treasury should be able to say 
no. But today the Ministry of the Treasury holds an ambiguous position, no 
longer that of “defender of the treasury” as opposed to the “advocates of 
spending” in accordance with the thesis of Wildavski manuals. On the one 
hand, it is interested in reducing costs of services and transfers; on the other, it 
must justify current costs, transfers to agencies, costs of supplies, expenses for 
bodies in liquidation, etc. This derives from the fact that in the absence of any 
true political leadership, the bodies of the State have become the main “clients” 
of the Ministry of the Treasury, which tends to respect the other administra­
tions and their operating and personnel costs, thus defending the administrative 
machine, but without concern for its productivity (respecting in particular the 
big administrations such as the Ministry of the Interior).
Lastly, objections came from the magistrates of the Court of Auditors, op­
posed (though not unanimously) to the introduction of subsequent controls and 




























































































“legislative decree” (decreto legge) of the Amato government on regional ju­
risdictions.
5. What I have not done and what I have kept from doing
Having described the difficulties, I will go on to discuss what I did not do, 
my “negative actions” as I call them.
According to program, I issued no more than one or two circulars in a 
year. This was because public administration suffers from paper-sickness. To 
give an example of this, a collection of the circulars issued in 1992 by the De­
partment of Public Administration (with the exclusion of those concerning the 
health sector) occupied a volume of 1045 pages.
Still according to program, I did not confront the problem of high civil 
service. Although this is a subject of major importance, it required more time, 
even for the preliminary work involved, than the Ciampi government had be­
fore it.
Much longer is the list of “negative acdons”, of blocking initiatives taken by 
others. These “negative actions” were all directed at preventing the improper 
use or abuse of public administradon by politicians or union leaders.
The first abuse of public administradon consists of a new type of privatiza­
tion, recently discovered in Italy, which entails costs rather than returns. It 
consists of abolishing activities proper to the State and turning them over to 
private companies, while acknowledging the personnel involved the right to 
remain State employees, and obliging public administrations to find jobs for 
them. Although this formula allows public agencies to be transformed into 
private corporations, it leaves surplus personnel on the shoulders of the State. 
The attempt was made to carry out a procedure of this kind for the monop­
olies, but this was prevented. It was attempted for the postal service as well, 
and a remedy was found by transforming the company into a public body, 
without allowing personnel to opt for State jobs and with the provision that the 





























































































The second abuse of public administration consists of hiring on a permanent 
basis the employees of public bodies which have been abolished. In 1993-1994, 
following previous examples, it was proposed that the State administration 
should absorb the employees of Efim and of the National Cellulose and Paper 
Agency, and their subsidiaries. In this case too (February 1994) the Ciampi 
government was able to resist strong pressure exerted by those involved.
Another abuse of public administration consists of finding permanent jobs 
for the so-called precari, persons originally hired on a short-term basis, usu­
ally for political reasons. On this subject, after a long discussion in the gov­
ernment and in Parliament, legislative decree (decreto legge) n° 148 of May 
20, 1993 was adopted, later converted into law n° 236 of July 19, 1993, pro­
viding that personnel hired on a short-term basis can be assigned permanent 
jobs in public administrations only after determination of the work load and 
after having passed tests or open competitions.
Even worse was the practice of giving jobs to persons extraneous to public 
administration such as the couriers mentioned above, which gave rise to heated 
discussions in June 1993.
Another abuse of public administration consists of ways for accelerating ca­
reers, variously defined as re-alignment, re-arrangement and reconstruction of 
career. Particularly involved in operations of this type are the Ministry of Fi­
nance and the various police forces, as well as those holding higher office. The 
Ministry of Finance, however, received a negative reply to its request, which 
involved skipping several career levels for all personnel. For the so-called 
equalization of the police forces, a process triggered by judicial decisions, the 
costs were minimized. For the higher offices, provisions were made in the 
first corrective decree to legislative decree (decreto legislativo) n° 29/1993, 
which led to the reformulating of Art. 57 and to blocking the practice of 
skipping to higher career levels.
These “negative actions” were accompanied by others, designed to oppose 
the centrifugal action of particular sectors or categories; for example, the gen­
eral managers who wished to have separate roles assigned to their own de­
partments, or the trade unions which wanted to participate in determining 
work loads.
Of all of these evils which - at least for a year - were in part avoided, the 
worst was undoubtedly that of giving permanent jobs to persons extraneous to 




























































































found that 70% of State employees had been hired, in the last 15 years, with­
out having passed a regular competitive examination and thus without suitable 
selection, in spite of constitutional provision of the competition (art.97). Since, 
moreover, a large percentage of the persons seeking a place in public adminis­
tration comes from the South, there is a surplus of personnel in that area, 
namely the double of the number of State employees in the North in propor­
tion to the population. The consequences of all this on the efficiency of the 
institutions, or on society’s opinion of public administration, which hires un­
justly, without giving everyone an equal chance to accede to public office, are 
obvious.
Although these phenomena have always been familiar, they became acute in 
the early nineties when, with the dissolution of the political class, the agencies 
of the State were free to do as they wished, as were individual parliamentari­
ans (of one of these it was said in Parliament that he cost the treasury 30 bil­
lion lire a day, for the initiatives he promoted in favor of one thing or an­
other). Along with the trade unions, they took the place of the political parties.
6. What I have been unable to do
Under the heading “liabilities” are to be listed the failures (and the partial 
successes).
The former regard the re-establishment of structures abolished by abroga­
tion in the referendums. I am referring to the Department of Entertainment 
and Tourism and the Ministry of Agricultural, Food and Forestry Resources.
The second failure concerned the reorganization of the judicial districts. 
This was a proposal which had slowly matured within the Ministry of Justice 
itself, but to which it was nonetheless opposed, fearing the reaction of the 
magistrates.
The third failure concerned the personnel of the former Agensud. Accord­
ing to the “Andreatta” legislative decree (decreto legislativo), these persons 
were supposed to either leave their jobs with retirement benefits or enter the 
public administration, but at the lowest career level, at salaries much lower 





























































































The fourth failure was that of the two laws passed by Parliament relevant to 
assigning unemployment benefits to employees of the political parties, and to 
absorption by the public administration of a certain number of employees of 
the parliamentary groups in the two Houses. In spite of the obstacles placed in 
the path of these provisions, it was possible only to set certain limits, through 
amendments, to this job-finding in the civil service.
Another failure was the one relevant to blocking automatic mechanisms ac­
tion performed by the Parliament. This was proposed by the confederated 
trade unions, and I was the promoter of the initiative in Parliament. Once it 
had been approved in the Senate Committee, however, the confederated trade 
unions reacted negatively, perhaps because they realized that it concerned not 
merely judges and university professors but also the vast category of teachers. 
This led to the need to amend the decision of the Senate Budget Committee, 
and to subsequent retreat on this issue.
As regards surplus personnel too, not much could be done. Although the 
number of surplus State employees was estimated in various surveys as rang­
ing from 80 thousand to 134 thousand, it was impossible to dismiss them in 
order to distribute personnel on a more rational basis.
But the greatest failure consists of not having managed, after having at­
tracted public opinion, to stimulate the interest of the users, whose voice is un­
heard by the administration and by public powers in general. The activity de­
signed to bestow sovereignty on the citizens and to reduce the expenses of the 
state machine had a cost and a benefit. The cost, consisting of the negative re­
action of bureaucracy, has been paid. But this action, calling on the users to 
control the suppliers of services, should have evoked a stronger echo among 
the citizens themselves. Poorly organized, however, and little aware of their 
own rights and of the costs they have to pay, these citizens failed to make their 
voice heard (particularly important in a country where services, and not pub­
lic ones alone, are of low quality and badly organized).
7. What remains to be done: the future of administrative reform
This survey would be incomplete without some mention of the future of 




























































































The administrative issue reappeared on the political agenda last year. How 
can it be kept there now, so that interest in it remains alive? To this question I 
would like to give an answer, which is the following: if the administrative is­
sue has become important due to its having been proposed in its essential 
terms, as social and economic problem, it must now be viewed, if it is to re­
main viable, under another aspect, that of constitutional reform.
No lengthy demonstration is required as proof of this assumption.
The administrative issue has long been restricted to the problem of employ­
ees. Since the 1980s, it has become a problem of functionality and efficiency 
of services as well. But only starting from 1993 have two aspects been noted, 
which are now clearly seen as prioritary, and which have awakened public 
opinion from neglect to interest.
The first aspect is the following: administrations should measure their own 
efficiency by the satisfaction of the users, who are the sovereigns of public 
service. Accordingly, they must respond to social demand and subject them­
selves to market testing. This is what I have called administrative issue viewed 
as social problem.
The second aspect is the following: public administrations must measure 
their own costs in terms of direct financial charges (those which are paid for 
by taxes) and indirect financial charges (those deriving from delays in tax 
collection, wasted time, inefficient services, etc.). The financial costs and the 
economic ones of the public administrations must be calculated and, if possi­
ble, reduced. This is what I have termed administrative problem as economic 
problem.
The “Public Service Charter” and the “Style Code” were the first step in this 
direction. The second step was the insertion in the budget for 1994 of an 
overall plan for modernizing the administration.
The first step has been implemented in various ways, in national and local 
public services. The second has produced remarkable results, considering that, 
in spite of the fact that many of its provisions have been suspended, the overall 
consumption of the Treasury, up to September, has remained below last year’s 
level. It may well be that Patrizio Bianchi was right when he declared, already 
on March 11, 1994: “We will discover that structural reforms such as those 




























































































Now, however, after so much work, the importance of the administrative 
question seems to be fading into the background. The new government has 
eliminated the issue of administrative reform, has given it a low profile, as the 
Americans say, by deciding not to decide. The consequences are evident.
The first consequence consists of postponing or suspending the reorganiza­
tion called for by law n° 537 of December 24, 1993. The Bill n° 777, now un­
der examination by the Senate, postpones the terms of the mandate. But this 
second passage through Parliament is bound to be a rough one, for a general 
reason which was indicated by Luigi Einaudi in an article published in II Cor- 
riere della Sera on June 29, 1921 :
“We should be skeptical of the government’s capacity to abolish 
sub-prefectures, prefectures, law courts, universities, commis­
saries, useless departments; but we should be much more skeptical 
about Parliament’s ability to put all of these great things into ef­
fect. Even those who believe that the government will do little are 
certain that Parliament would do less than nothing. Each of the 
offended interests would find its own champion in the House; and 
the coalition of defenders would effectively frustrate any effective 
action”.
With general reorganization postponed, centrifugal tendencies take on new 
force, leading to the splintering of initiatives, as clearly exemplified by the 
proposed reform of the Ministry of Public Works, the reorganization of the 
Ministry of the Environment, the new direction to be taken by Aima, etc. 
Other initiatives betray the purposes of the reform. The best example is that of 
the so-called privatization of sixteen welfare agencies, which has led to the in­
tensification of public control over them.
In addition, ancient evils of public administration have re-emerged. To give 
only a few examples, legislative decree (decreto legge) n° 513 of August 27, 
1994, converted into law n° 595 of October 28, 1994, provides in Article 3.1 
for transferring personnel from the abolished National Cellulose and Paper 
Agency and its subsidiaries to State administrations, public bodies and regional 
governments. The conversion law of legislative decree (decreto legge) n° 643 
of November 22, 1994, provides for reabsorbing into the public administra­
tions not only the employees of EFIM (a large public holding) but also those 
of its financing companies, services and financial services (but this law was 
sent back to the Chambers in the presidential message of November 18, 1994). 




























































































law n° 596 of October 28, 1994, stipulates in Art. 2.16 that municipalities with 
financial problems can establish labour relations through short-term contracts 
lasting one year, thus re-opening a chapter considered closed consequent to de­
cree (decreto legge) n° 148 of May 20, 1993, converted into law n° 236 of 
July 19, 1993. The last version of the legislative decree (decreto legge) con­
taining “urgent measures concerning the financial treatment of State personnel 
as regards public employment” extends to January 31, 1995 short-term labour 
contracts, which were supposed to terminate - according to the aforesaid 1993 
law - in 1994. Future developments are heralded as well. The Secretary Gen­
eral of the Ministry of Finance, in an interview on November 18, 1994 with II 
Sole-24 Ore, asked for recognition of the special nature of the qualifications of 
the Ministry of Finance and a salary supplement for the employees of the 
Ministry in relation to the tax revenue collected. These requests were followed 
by this comment: “I could call it my program, but also that of the unions. It is 
perhaps less that of the Public Administration, which necessarily takes an 
overall, unitary view”.
I have already said that, to get around this impasse, constitutional reform 
must be linked to administrative modernization. This is the only way to capi­
talize on the positive results achieved up to now and to find new paths, as 
fruitful as those explored in 1993-1994.
I will demonstrate this thesis in two points. The first concerns the in­
eluctable need for change in the formal Constitution of 1948; the second, the 
close links between Constitution and administration.
A reform of the formal Constitution is now indispensable, since the current 
system is no longer valid, now that a majoritarian electoral system has been 
introduced, without modifying the distribution of powers among public orga­
nizations.
Proof of this can be seen in two paradoxes. The first is that which has been 
created between the Constitution, calling for indirect investiture of the gov­
ernment (which is appointed by the President of the Republic and obtains the 
confidence of Parliament) and an electoral system moving toward direct in­
vestiture (the majority of the electoral body chooses the government, the 
middle term, consisting of Parliament, becoming less important; consequently, 
if the government falls, Parliament must fall as well).
The second contradiction is between a majoritarian system, entailing an 




























































































making 51 equivalent to 100), and the retaining of a Constitution and ordinary 
laws which guarantee the independence of judges, of the state television sys­
tem, of the Bank of Italy, etc.
Now, while reform of the Constitution is assuming new importance, it is es­
sential to remember that a better Constitution does not necessary and mechani­
cally result in a more efficient administration. On the other hand, the general 
public tends to evaluate institutions on the basis of their overall efficiency, 
without distinguishing between top management and base organization. It will 
thus be necessary to constitutionalize public administration, as well as the plan 
for its modernization.
To implement this plan, five points are essential. The first concerns the 
place to be assigned to the law, in regard to decisions made by the executive. 
The sphere of laws should be reduced, restoring to them their function of 
framework-regulations, leaving space for the decisions of other bodies of the 
State.
The second is that of the relationship between politics and administration, 
with the consequent problems. The administrative bodies should be acknowl­
edged a status of a separate order, based on principles of impartiality, legality 
and merit. In other words, the State should be organized as a group, with a 
holding company, sectorial and subsidiary holding companies, as in Sweden or 
the United Kingdom (this orientation is also known as “contracting out” and 
“outsourcing”, but all of these terms indicate the same thing - contracting 
services to external companies, since the essential ones are carried out much 
better).
The third point is that of the relationship between citizens and administra­
tion. It is important to constitutionalize some basic principles of the laws on 
procedure, to transform definitively the members of society from subjects to 
citizens (after all, the Constitution is the area designated to listing the rights of 
the citizens).
The fourth point is that of neutral powers and autonomous powers and the 
consequent reduction in central administrations. Decisions should be shifted to 
peripheral bodies, leaving to the center the task of assistance, rather than that 
of guide for the peripheral bodies. Care must be taken, however, not to mul­
tiply the levels of government by extending public powers, as is done by the 




























































































erated States are inserted, the end result will be that of subtracting public pow­
ers from the citizens and rendering organization more confused.
The fifth point is that of checks and balances. To realize a polycentric con­
stitutional organization, it will be necessary to build a solid foundation for the 
polyarchy.
To assimilate administrative reform and change in the formal Constitution, 
the scholastic axioms with which both scientific culture and public opinion are 
imbued must be abandoned. In the former, Constitution is distinguished from 
administration, just as in the latter a distinction is made between “high 
branches” and “low branches” of institutions.
Today public administrations are embroiled in a two-fold crisis of legiti­
macy. This is, firstly, a crisis in the legitimacy of investiture, concerning their 
capacity to listen to the demands of the general public.; and secondly, a crisis 
in the legitimacy of performance, concerning their capacity to satisfy, effi­
ciently and fairly, the requests of the citizens. Society assigns importance to 
both aspects, as Robert Putnam has clearly demonstrated in recent research.
In the light of this diagnosis, the present situation is lamentable. Two ex­
amples are sufficient to demonstrate this. The recent case of the flood in the 
Piemonte region, where delays in sending out the alarm showed that public 
administrations tend to maximize interference but are then unable to commu­
nicate or - when they manage to do so - it is not to notify facts or events, but 
to discharge responsibility.
A second example is provided by the widespread corruption discovered in 
Milan. After two years, the repressive and corrective action is continuing, but 
few have asked the question of how further cases of corruption, certain to oc­
cur, can be prevented.
“Mistrust and discontent with the public administration are now a general 
state of mind, reinforced by emotional factors and wide-spread among the 
people. The negative phase is at its height. The struggle against bureaucracy, 
the hatred for its mechanisms, intricate and sterile, have become common­
places. Wherever the State intervenes, it shows itself inadequate to its tasks. 
This is the firm conviction of everyone”. These prophetic words were written 




























































































The work undertaken in 1993-1994 has provoked many reactions, but has 
also aroused great expectations. It is essential not to disappoint the latter and 
not to encourage the former, so that natural skepticism as to the capacity of 
legislative and governmental powers to carry out, with assiduity and con­
stancy, a serious administrative reform, will not prevail.
8. Conclusions
In conclusion. Those who intend to reorganize administration must be pre­
pared to confront widespread skepticism in regard to their efforts. If con­
vinced, however, that a “good administration conditions the welfare of a na­
tion”, they will have to take progressive steps forward, with great patience 
(the motto adopted by me during that period was seid geduldig: be patient).
For this patience I have received various rewards. One of these was given 
me and the Ciampi government by a Spanish friend, who likened our com­
mitment to that of Turgot in 1774-1776, calling to my attention the chapter in 
Condorcet’s biography of the Badinters entitled La vertu au pouvoir. Another 
reward was given me by a seasoned parliamentarian who sent me the follow­
ing note, during the parliamentary debate in the Senate on December 22, 1993:
“Dear Minister, I was thinking, while listening to ministers and 
former ministers, of your constructive and reconstructive work 
for this budget: painstaking, patient work, capable of providing 
true “inventions”, aimed toward a goal a bit further on. Not ac­
companied by incense and myrrh, but by seriousness, knowledge, 
experience. This was what a d.c. (Ndt: former Christian Demo­
crat) with half a century of experience wanted to tell you; that he 
has known presumed builders and re-builders of the State; but 
very few real geniuses, who remind me of 'the labourers in the 
vineyard’. One of these is yourself’.
I am frequently asked: won’t all of this fervent study and initiative be lost? 
(implying, was it worthwhile to commit yourself so strongly?) To some of 
these quesdoners I may reply in the words of Tocqueville, in one of his last 





























































































“Who has produced this French revolution, in a word:, the 
greatest event in history? ... Was it the politicians of the XVIII 
century, the princes, the ministers, the great lords? They .... al­
most always failed to accomplish what they intended, obtaining in 
the end a result they detested. The great artificers of this 
formidable revolution ... are the authors ... it was political science 
and, frequently, the most abstract science, which deposited in the 
spirits of our fathers all those germs of innovation from which 
have suddenly blossomed so many political institutions and civil 
laws ...”.
To others who ask I reply that - as shown in an excellent book by Dora 
Marucco - all of the changes of that turning point in our nation, the Giolittian 
era, were prepared in the preceding thirty-year period, by a myriad of minis­
terial committees which analyzed, discussed, selected and proposed reforms. 
We may therefore justifiably expect, in the century to come, either a revolu­
tion or a great politician-achiever.
I began by speaking of Peter Schlemihl and his attempts to get rid of his 
shadow. For having believed he could sell his own shadow, he lost his soul. 
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